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significant state or local government action. The court stated agency
failure to recognize an actionable threat was not conclusive because
agency decisionmakers are constrained by institutional and financial
issues.
The court considered Partnership's cross motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that "disposal" required active migration
and held the statute included passive migration. As directed by
CERCLA, the court based its analysis on the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act's ("RCRA") definition of "disposal." The court
considered RCRA's terms "discharge," "spilling," and "leaking" on
their face, under common law interpretations, and on statutory intent.
The court found the terms had well-recognized passive meanings. The
court held only a strained reading of the language, in the context of
RCRA, required active migration. Finally, the court found active
migration contradicted the intent of CERCLA's broad remedial goals.
Other CERCLA issues decided by the court included the
Government's claim Carson Harbor failed to show a causal nexus
between response costs incurred and contamination. The court
dismissed the claim, finding Congress's deletion of specific statutory
language indicative of intent not to require a causal link.
The court found common law challenges to statutorily authorized
conduct invalid and affirmed summary judgment for the Government
on Carson Harbor's nuisance claims. The Government received
NPDES permits to cover storm run-off. Because the California Civil
Code prevents common law challenges to acts performed under
express authority of a statute, the Government was not liable.
In negating a causation requirement and finding passive migration
in disposal of hazardous materials, the court found the district court's
grant of summary judgment conflicted with the broad-based remedial
intent of the statute.
ChristineEllison
United States v. Hagberg, 207 F.3d 569 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding
disposers of sewage pumped from septic tanks receiving only domestic
sewage are disposing of sewage sludge from a treatment works treating
domestic sewage within the meaning of and pursuant to regulations of
the Clean Water Act).
In September 1997, Jamie John Hagberg ("Hagberg") pumped
sewage material from the septic tank of the Cozy Corner Bar in Lavina,
Montana, into his H & H Septic and Drain Company pump truck.
Hagberg then discharged the sewage along a 1.6 mile stretch of road.
The government indicted him for "knowingly disposing of domestic
sewage on a public contact site" under sections 1345(e) and
1319(c)(2) of the Clean Water Act. Subsection 1345(e) makes it
"unlawful for any person to dispose of sludge from a publicly owned
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treatment works or any other treatment works treating domestic
sewage for any use for which regulations have been established
pursuant to subsection (d) of this section .... ." Subsection 1319(c)
states that "any person who... knowingly violates section... 1345 of
this title shall be punished by fine of not less than $5,000 nor more
than $50,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment for not more
than three years, or by both."
Hagberg, in his pre-trial motion to dismiss, argued Cozy Corner's
septic tank was not a "publicly owned treatment works" or "any other
The district court
treatment works treating domestic sewage."
dismissed the indictment, finding the material that Hagberg pumped
was not sewage sludge under 40 C.F.R. Part 503. It concluded that
sewage material was not generated during any kind of treatment, the
septic tank at issue was not a treatment works, and 40 C.F.R. Part 503
was not intended to govern the internal processes of domestic septic
tanks. The United States appealed, arguing the district court misread
and misinterpreted the regulations governing Hagberg's actions. The
issue before the appeals court was whether the material Hagberg
discharged was "sewage sludge." The court reviewed this case of first
impression de novo.
The court analyzed section 1345 in its entirety. Subsections (a),
(b), (d), and (f) direct the Environmental Protection Agency to
administer a permit system set up by Congress and to promulgate
regulations regarding the disposal of sewage sludge. The regulations,
promulgated in 40 C.F.R Part 503, establish the requirements set forth
could be implemented through a permit or directly enforced absent a
permit. Part 503, thus, requires all efforts at using or disposing of
sewage sludge to comply, whether or not a permit is mandated under
section 1345.
Hagberg, relying on this dual enforcement mechanism for his
position, argued the term "treatment works treating sewage" found in
subsection 1345(e) ought to be defined under 40 C.F.R. Part 122.2.
Part 122.2, however, pertains to the permit scheme's regulatory
definition pursuant to Parts 122-24. Whether Hagberg was required
to obtain a permit was not the issue. Therefore, the court concluded
Hagberg's actions implicated Part 503 regulations and its "direct
enforcement" provision.
The court examined Part 503's sewage sludge and domestic
septage definitions to determine if the material Hagberg discharged
fell within section 1345. Part 503.9(w) states that "sewage sludge is
solid, semi-solid, or liquid residue generated during the treatment of
domestic sewage in treatment works. Sewage sludge includes, but is
not limited to, domestic septage." Part 503.9(f) states that "[d]omestic
septage is either liquid or solid material removed from a septic tank,
cesspool, portable toilet.., or similar treatment works." The court
combined these regulatory definitions and found material removed
from a septic tank receiving only domestic sewage was sewage sludge
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generated during the treatment of domestic sewage in a treatment
works. This conclusion brought Hagberg's conduct within the
meaning of subsection 1345(e). The court further found that, taken
in context with other definitions, a domestic septic tank is a treatment
works for the purposes of the direct enforceability regulation in Part
503. It, therefore, concluded that the district court erred in finding
that Cozy Corner's septic tank was not a "treatment works" or not
engaged in "treatment," and the "gunk at issue" was not sewage sludge.
The court pieced together several subsections of Part 503.9 to
reach the meaning of "sewage sludge from a... treatment works
treating domestic sewage." However, such a process did not detract
from the conclusion that the regulatory definition is plain on its face.
In finding that Hagberg's conduct fell within the meaning of section
1345, the court found the district court improperly dismissed the
indictment.
It, therefore, reversed and remanded for further
proceedings.
Elizabeth Appleton

TENTH CIRCUIT
Sanpete Water Conservancy Dist. v. Carbon Water Conservancy Dist.,
226 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding there is no breach of contract
of a "no protest" clause when one party's conduct is outside the
conditions of the agreement, nor could their actions be construed as a
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing of the
same agreement when the party follows legal channels to dispute a
proposed dam project).
Sanpete Water Conservation District ("Sanpete") and Carbon
Water Conservancy District ("Carbon") had a long history of water
rights disputes in the Price River Valley and Sanpete County Area. In
1933, the Bureau of Reclamation ("Bureau") prepared the Gooseberry
Project, which entailed water storage on Gooseberry Creek, a tributary
of the Price River, and diversion of Gooseberry Creek water through
an intermountain tunnel into Sanpete County. Price River Water
Conservancy District ("Price"), the water right owner of Gooseberry
Creek, stored their water in Scofield Reservoir. Carbon owned shares
of stock in Price. Scofield Reservoir's dam was deteriorating, and as a
result became part of the Gooseberry Project. Repairs to the dam
became a priority, and the balance of the Gooseberry Project never
occurred.

